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extriosic evij^rjce to clarir; the parties* intent. These findings
were affirmed by the Utah Supreme court whicii, st-at-pdi

"If a trial court interprets a contract as a matter of
law, we accord its construction no particular weight,
reviewing its action under a correctness standard."
699 P.2d at 716.
Thus, the threshold question of whether a contract is
ambiguous is itself a question of law which must be reviewed by
this Court before a determination can be made whether the lower
court properly considered extrinsic evidence and the quality of
that extrinsic evidence. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292
(Utah, 1983).
In this case Judge Uno found that the contract was
unambiguous which Plaintiff asserts is error. This Court must
review that error, in the first instance, without resort to any
evidence which may be of record.
Indeed, the lease contract at issue in this case is
similar to that construed by the Court in the case of Seashores,
Inc. v.

Hancey, supra.

In that case the contract was held to be

ambiguous when it referred to information on "other sheets" and
"other contract documents". The court reasoned that without
resort to the other documents referenced in the contract it was
impossible to determine whether the main contract contained all
material terms and was thus ambiguous. Similarly, in the case at
bar, reviewing the renewal termination language in paragraph 4 is
so unclear that it raises many questions about what the parties1
intended and is therefore ambiguous. If the Lessor intends to
terminate, as that paragraph provides, the question arises of

when can this termination be exercised - is it after one ten year
term, after a "like successive period" (twenty years) or after
"like successive period or periods." (thirty, forty, or
infinity)? This ambiguity arises by failure to define the length
of time meant by "period" as used in that paragraph or to provide
a reference and definition for the phrase "said term" which can
literally mean from ten years through perpetuity. As found by the
court in the Seashores case a lack of clarity in such a situation
requires a finding that the contract is ambiguous.
Lastly, once an ambiguity is found in a contract and
extrinsic evidence is considered to resolve the ambiguity, if the
contract is still unclear a court must apply the rule of
construction to interpret the ambiguity against the drafter of
the contract. This approach was recently clarified in the Court
of Appeals case of Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, (Utah App.
1988) 748 P.2d 582, 583, and footnotes 1 and 2, and cases cited
therein.

It is for this purpose that the affidavits of the

Plaintiffs should have been considered by Judge Uno to explicate
for the court the expectations of the previous lessors on the
lease term issue. After an appraisal of Plaintiff and Defendants
evidence on this point, Plaintiff submits the intent of the original contracting parties is still in conflict and cannot be
determined with the result that the lease should be construed
against the drafter, Reagan Outdoor Advertising.
II.

DOES APPLICATION OF "ENGLISH RULES OF CONSTRUCTION"
REQUIRE A FINDING FOR DEFENDANTS

The Respondent argues that there is no ambiguity in
paragraph 4 of the lease because of the presence of a semi-colon
which in effect links two independent clauses. In this way
Respondent asserts that the lease provides for an automatic
renewal and then contains subsequent language providing for
possible termination at the end of this renewal.
This complicated approach does not clarify the intent of
the parties or eliminate ambiguity in this lease. Rather, it in
fact adds additional ambiguity. Indeed, the need to discuss grammatical technicalities to interpret the lease is evidence of its
misleading, ambiguous nature. The language in question at
paragraph 4 is as follows:
"This lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period; thereafter, this
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and
conditions for a like successive period or periods,
unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination
within ninety days of the end of said term".
Lease Agreement, para. 4.
If the semi-colon in the third line is indeed replaced
by a period as Respondent asserts, the following sentence still
contains an ambiguity. For example, if the lease term of ten
years was extended automatically for a "successive period" then a
total of twenty years will have elapsed. Looking at the language
following the work "thereafter" there is again language calling
for a continuation of the lease for "a like successive period or
periods" unless a termination notice is delivered. A question

thus arises whether termination is permissible after twenty
years, thirty years, forty years, or in effect, never as the
interpretation of "successive period or periods" is entirely
undefined in this contract. Thus, there is indeed no resolution
to the patent ambiguity of this paragraph under Respondent's analysis.
It is well settled that any document must be construed
from its four corners and all provisions construed together and
not in isolation. Barnhart v. McKinney, 682 P.2d 112 (1982, K S . ) .
Since there are still critical questions as to when the lessor
can terminate this lease, which a court cannot answer within the
four corners of this document, the lease must be held to be ambiguous.

Fundamentally, the goal of contract interpretation is to

give it the meaning intended by the parties and rules of grammar
should not be permitted to control the construction of a contract
when to do so would render language meaningless.

Rubenstein v.

Weil 408 P.2d 140, (New Mexico, 1965). Certainly, a reasonable
interpretation of the term and termination provisions of this
lease contract should begin with a reference to the explicit
language stated in paragraph 2 which states that the contract is
one for a "term of ten years" and referring then to paragraph 4
where the lessor may terminate "within ninety days at the end of
said term". There is no other reference to the word "term" other
than this ten year reference and a logical construction is that a
lessor may thus terminate within "ninety days of the end of said

term". That is, at the end of ten years as Plaintiff attempted.
Such a construction does not resort to grammatical revision
or technicalities of punctuation but is a direct and reasonable interpretation of the contract language itself.

This is

supported by the well settled view that specific provisions where
they exist in a contract, will supercede and qualify more general
ones. Norman v. Recreation Centers of Sun City, Inc., 752 P.2d
514 (Ariz. App., 1988).
Respondent's brief cites Hampton v. Lum,

544 SW.2d

(Civ. Ct. App.TX. 1976), and Faulkner v. Farnsworth, supra, to
support its argument that the lease is not ambiguous. Both these
cases are distinguishable as presenting fact situations very different than the one at issue. In Lum the lease had a renewal term
that clearly contained the word "renewal" and the lease at issue
here does not. Faulkner was held to be an ambiguous lease because
too many questions were raised by written changes to a standard
agreement.

In the present lease the language is purporting to

create a right of "renewal" is amenable to numerous interpretations, is hidden, and is phrased in a misleading manner. This
lack of clarity makes the term ambiguous, and this Court should
find so.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons this Court should find that
the lease contract is ambiguous and should be construed against
the drafter defendant Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Alternatively,
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